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The strong growth performance of developing countries in East Asia has been 
fueled by  inflows of foreign, especially Japanese, capital. However, dramatic 
changes in the Japanese economy and elsewhere across the globe are sure to 
have  a major impact on future patterns of  saving and investment worldwide. 
Based on these anticipated changes, many analysts see the threat of  a global 
capital shortage, with dire implications for those areas most dependent on fi- 
nancial inflows from abroad. 
This paper reviews the evidence for an impending world shortage of capital 
and assesses the implications for East Asia of increased competition for inter- 
national investment. The paper focuses in particular on the role of foreign di- 
rect investment, often a potent mechanism for the international transfer of ad- 
vanced technology and manufacturing organization. One surprising conclusion 
is that a regime of high capital costs could actually provide further encourage- 
ment for the already rapid growth of direct investments from the Asian newly 
industrialized countries (N1Cs)-Hong  Kong,  Korea, Singapore, Taiwan- 
into other Asian nations. 
6.1  What We Mean by a Capital Shortage 
The possibility of world “shortage” of capital or savings has clearly become 
a concern among economic analysts as well as policymakers (Solomon 1991; 
IMF 1991b). Although the concept is seldom made precise, such a shortage 
presumably exists when ex ante demand from potential investors exceeds the 
supply of savings at given terms. If capital transactions are mediated by banks 
and other market-based private financial institutions, a capital shortage in this 
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sense might be expected to occur at most transiently, with any incipient gap 
between global savings and global investment quickly eliminated by  an in- 
duced rise in  real rates of  interest. One possible interpretation of  a capital 
shortage is thus simply an upward movement in real interest rates.’ But the 
history of  global capital movements over the past two decades suggests this 
view is at best incomplete and misses some important features of real-world 
flows, especially flows to developing countries. 
A first crucial omission is the time dimension. Some frequently cited factors 
underlying the predicted global shortage of capital are secular trends, the most 
important among these being the decline in private saving in  the industrial 
nations. Others represent large but strictly temporary developments, such as 
the capital requirements of Kuwait’s reconstruction efforts following the 199 1 
Gulf War. In the early 1990s, a recession in the United States and several other 
major nations kept private investment in those regions unusually low despite 
stimulative monetary policy, and the trend  in interest rates has been down 
rather than up. 
In the United States, one reason for a very sluggish response to monetary 
stimulation was that, although short-term interest rates dropped to near-record 
lows, long rates fell much less. While stickiness of the long rates may have 
simply reflected lenders’ worries about future inflation, an alternative interpre- 
tation is that markets anticipated a global capital shortage that would material- 
ize as the industrial nations recovered. 
A second problem with the simple story suggested above is the assumption 
that the market response to changes in supply and demand consists mainly of 
a movement in price, i.e., interest rate. Even in well-developed financial mar- 
kets, the reality is far more complex. Large long-term changes in supply and 
demand in a given financial market surely have some impact on interest rates 
facing those currently in that market, but they also stimulate major shifts of 
transactors between markets and promote the development of  new  financial 
instruments and markets. The impact may thus vary according to the type of 
transaction. 
The 1970s offer a graphic illustration of the importance of induced institu- 
tional change. Few of the actual consequences of petrodollar recycling in the 
1970s could have been predicted by  extrapolation from the institutional ar- 
rangements already in place in  1973. Indeed, an analysis that focused on the 
marginal responses of the important pre- 1973 players and institutions would 
have missed almost all of the action. Rather than attempting to increase loans 
by cutting rates to current borrowers, international bankers literally roamed the 
world in search of profitable new markets. Thanks to these efforts, by  1981 
1. Berner and Sargen (1990) treat a global capital shortage as synonymous with higher real 
interest rates. Collins and Rodrik (1991) also emphasize estimates of  resulting interest-rate  in- 
creases in their analysis of macroeconomic impact abroad from restructuring in the former So- 
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Table 6.1  Funds Raised on International Credit Markets, by Type of Borrower, 
1981 and 1989 (% of total) 
1981  1989 
Developed countries  68.4  87.8 
Eastern Europe and USSR  0.8  1.3 
Developing countries  27.5  6.7 
Multilateral institutions  3.3  4.2 
Source; Calculated from United Nations (1991, table A-30). 
developing nations accounted for more than one-quarter of all funds raised on 
the international credit markets (see table 6.1). Of course, the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s led to another major shift, and by  1989 the share of developing 
nations had dropped to less than 7 percent. For the  1990s, new shifts across 
markets are already evident. In particular, borrowers in many regions, but most 
notably Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, are shifting away from 
commercial borrowing in favor of the World Bank and the international Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF) as potential sources of new loans, while at the same time a 
few developing countries are attempting a modest return to bank loans and 
bond issues as sources of new capital (IMF 1991b). 
The final and most important problem with the simple story is that much of 
the world’s  international flow of  capital, and in particular the flow to devel- 
oping nations, is not in fact mediated by  well-developed, highly integrated, 
financial markets. In this category are foreign direct investment, some lending 
and some borrowing by  national governments, and most lending by  multilat- 
eral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. In  1987, bilateral and 
multilateral official development finance (loans and grants) accounted for two- 
thirds of net resource flows from OECD nations to developing nations, while 
direct investment accounted for two-thirds of  the remainder (see table 6.2). 
Although these channels differ significantly, an important common element is 
that in each case a capital shortage is likely to be met through some type of 
rationing of credit (or of grants) in addition to-or  even instead of-a  simple 
rise in its interest cost. An analysis that focuses on interest rates alone assumes 
that transactors lend or borrow freely at those rates, yet for most types of trans- 
actions this assumption is incorrect. Even when financial capital is highly mo- 
bile internationally, the terms borrowers face from various alternative sources 
of credit may be linked only loosely.2 
2. Frankel’s (1991) results indicating a high degree of  international capital mobility are based 
on a comparison across currencies of rates on highly standardized securities (government bonds), 
a tiny slice of overall capital markets. Mobility in this sense is likely to be much greater than in 
the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) sense. The breakdown of the Feldstein-Horioka relationship in the 
1980s was driven mainly by a surge in U.S.  government borrowing and thus may give little indica- 
tion of the prospects for international flows overall, especially flows to areas in which even govern- 
ment debt cannot be viewed as a riskless asset. The idea of a capital market consisting of  loosely 170  Rachel McCulloch 
Table 6.2  Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, by Type, 1980 and 1987 
(70 of total) 
1980  1987 
Official development finance 
Export credits 
Private flows 
Direct investment (OECD only) 




















Source: OECD (1988, table ItI-I). 
Note:  Details may not add to totals due to rounding. 
A second important common characteristic of  capital flows to developing 
nations is the desire on the part of the lenders, and sometimes also on the part 
of the borrowers, for continuing involvement between the source of capital and 
the investment activity financed by  that capital. For both official development 
finance and private direct investment, arm’s-length transactions are rare excep- 
tions; the prevailing assumption is that the investment’s rate of  return will be 
enhanced when the lender also engages in monitoring, training, technology 
transfer, marketing, and other functions that entail an ongoing multidimen- 
sional relationship with the borrower. 
The relatively large role of bank credit in the 1970s and early 1980s accom- 
modated the long-standing desire of many developing nations to “unbundle” 
activities previously carried out through direct investment, i.e., to substitute 
arm’s-length transactions (debt) for ones requiring complex ongoing links with 
the lender (equity). Had direct investment rather than bank loans been the ma- 
jor vehicle for channeling petrodollars to developing nations, failed projects 
would have produced disappointing results for corporate stockholders rather 
than an international debt crisis. In addition, the failure rate for projects under- 
taken with these funds might well have been lower. 
6.2  The Crunch in Bank Credit 
A related but different problem from the hypothesized global capital short- 
age is the credit crunch arising from international banks’ attempts to meet the 
new  capital-adequacy  standard  of  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements 
(BIS). This standard, called the Base1 standard, requires commercial banks to 
have $4 of equity capital for each $100 of  risk-weighted assets. To meet the 
standard, many banks have needed to increase capital or to reduce the average 
riskiness of  their asset portfolio. In Japan, the adjustment process has been 171  An Asian Capital Crunch? Implications of a Global Capital Shortage 
complicated by the sharp decline in the stock market, because Japanese banks 
hold stocks as part of their capital base (Murray 1992). 
The recent increase in the vigilance of bank regulators in a number of coun- 
tries provides a second reason to anticipate qualitative change in banking prac- 
tice. With new regulatory standards in place and old ones enforced with greater 
zeal, bankers are likely to favor the most conservative lending choices. Since 
capital adequacy is measured on a risk-adjusted basis, one paradoxical result 
may have been lower bank-lending rates to certain classes of borrowers (e.g., 
U.S. Treasury bonds; in the early 1990s,  market-determined rates on Treasuries 
fell to their lowest level in decades) as banks attempted to expand their safest 
investments at the expense of riskier ones (e.g., loans to smaller businesses). 
Changes in bank behavior have little or no direct effect on either the supply 
of savings or the demanh for new investment, although they are likely to have 
important effects on the process by  which the two are reconciled. Moreover, 
because changes in bank behavior affect the money-supply process, regulatory 
changes have the potential to translate into a significant monetary shock. Thus, 
the overall impact of regulatory changes in banking may be far from negligible, 
especially for countries like the United States that are in the early stages of 
recovery from recession. However, the underlying problem here is not a capital 
shortage but a disruption in established patterns of financial intermediation.3 
6.3  Trends in Saving 
Since the explosion of international capital flows in the early 1970s, a few 
supersavers among the world's  nations have accounted for the lion's  share of 
net capital inflows to the rest. However, as figure 6.1 and table 6.3 illustrate, 
the identity of those important few has not remained constant over time. In the 
1970s, the major source of  new external financing was the recycled current- 
account surpluses of  OPEC nations. In the  1980s, although some OPEC na- 
tions continued to show sizable surpluses, Germany and Japan dominated total 
outflows of surplus national savings (see tables 6.3 and 6.4)." But for the 1990s, 
new circumstances suggest that each of these sources may make a smaller con- 
tribution to global flows. 
The national savings shortfall relative to domestic investment in the United 
linked segments is similar to the preferred habitat analysis used by Modigliani and Sutch (1966) 
to analyze the term structure of interest rates. 
3.There may be a parallel to the late 1980s, when the behavior of asset markets reflected in part 
the market response to unfamiliar investment opportunities opened up by  financial deregulation. 
Recent regulatory developments have been a response to the unforeseen responses of deregulated 
markets. 
4. Table 6.4 also underscores the extent of error in national current-account statistics. The dis- 
crepancy between total world current-account surpluses and the corresponding total deficits proba- 
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Fig. 6.1  Sources and destinations of world capital flows 
Source: McCulloch and  Petri (1992). 
States has been  widely discussed, and widely deplored, both  at home and 
abroad. Less often noted is that the OECD area as a whole has shown evidence 
of a secular decline in national saving. Analysts explain this reduction, present 
in  many  but not all OECD nations, in terms of  the slowing of  population 
growth and the associated aging of the population, as well as by reduced gov- 
ernment saving-smaller  budget surpluses or larger budget deficits-that  has 
not been entirely offset by  greater private saving (Dean, Durand, Fallon, and 
Hoeller 1990). Although Japan continues to save more than its OECD counter- 
parts, it too has experienced a secular decline in the saving rate. However, the 
effect of this trend on Japan’s capital exports has been masked by  two other 
important changes, the integration of Japan’s financial markets into world capi- 173  An Asian Capital Crunch? Implications of a Global Capital Shortage 
Table 6.3  Current Account Positions of Selected Countries, 1974-91 
(billion $ U.S.) 
1974  1980  1986  1990  1991 
Oil exporters 
Kuwait  5.9"  15.3  5.3  -2.2  - 
Saudi Arabia  23.0  42.8  -11.9  -4.1  - 
Germany  10.6  -  14.0  39.9  46.4  -20.6 
Japan  -4.7  -  10.8  85.8  35.9  72.9 
United States  1.9  1.8  -  145.4  -92.1  -8.7 
OECD 
Source: IMF (1988, 1992). 
"Figure for 1975. 
Table 6.4  Current Account Positions by Region and Selected Country, 1990 
(billion $ U.S.) 
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Sources: IMF (1991a, table A-1); World Bank (1992, table 18). 
"Details are for selected countries only and so may not add to totals. 
tal markets and a secular decline, albeit from a very high level, in the rate of 
domestic investment spending. 
In the short run, two temporary but important factors could operate in the 
opposite direction, producing a higher rather than lower OECD saving rate. A 
sharp decline in real estate prices in many areas, especially in the United States 174  Rachel McCuUoch 
and the United Kingdom, has greatly reduced the ability of households to fi- 
nance spending through home-equity loans. Negative wealth effects from the 
fall in real estate and equity prices may  also reduce household spending in 
Japan and some other parts of East Asia. 
6.4  The Emergence of Newly Industrializing Supersavers 
Most analysts conclude that the likely net effect of the factors summarized 
above will be to shrink the global supply of savings in the 1990s, at least once 
the major industrial economies have  resumed normal growth. However, the 
now-standard account omits what may be the most important potential source 
of international capital flows for the 1990s and beyond: the developing coun- 
tries themselves, and particularly those in East Asia. While inflows of foreign 
resources have played a significant  role in the development of each of the NICs, 
their very high rates of domestic capital formation have been financed primar- 
ily by  very high rates of  domestic saving. Moreover, the NICs have already 
shown their potential as capital exporters, although their current contribution 
to global capital flows is still small relative to that of Japan. Their high (and in 
some cases, still rising) saving rates, together with strong growth, suggest these 
nations cannot be ignored in predicting trends in international capital flows, 
and especially flows within East Asia. 
Ironically, the main pressure to limit potential capital exports from these 
new sources comes from the world’s number one international borrower, the 
United States. During the  1980s, U.S. policymakers viewed Asian current- 
account surpluses as the major factor underlying record current-account defi- 
cits at home. The root problem was thus seen-at  least in Washington-as  an 
excess supply of  financial capital in Asia rather than an excess demand for 
financial capital in America. Accordingly, the U.S. response was to urge (or 
even demand) adoption of policies in Japan and the Asian NICs to reduce capi- 
tal exports-domestic  expansion and exchange-rate appreciation in Asia, plus 
direct management of trade flows between Asian nations and the United States. 
Korea, for example, moved from a peak current-account surplus of more than 
$14 billion in 1988, to a 1990 current-account deficit of more than $2 billion, 
while Taiwan’s current-account surplus fell from nearly $18 billion in 1987 to 
less than $11 billion in  1990 (IMF 1992). 
Whether the U.S. approach made sense in the 1980s is open to debate, but 
its disadvantages are clearly magnified in a period of anticipated global capital 
shortage. Nonetheless, the same pressures to limit Asian current-account sur- 
pluses remain in place in the 1990s. Although the overall U.S. current-account 
position improved dramatically from 1988 to  1992, at least part of  that im- 
provement is expected to be reversed as the economy recovers. The challenge 
is thus to encourage, or at least not to discourage, Asian capital exports to other 
nations, while at the same time continuing to reduce politically troublesome 
U.S. bilateral trade imbalances with Japan and the Asian NICs. 175  An Asian Capital Crunch? Implications of a Global Capital Shortage 
6.5  Trends in Investment 
While the prospects for expansion of the global supply of savings are at best 
clouded even when trends among the Asian NICs are taken into account, there 
are many new reasons to anticipate an increased overall demand for those sav- 
ings, especially  once  the  OECD nations have  recovered  from the  current 
slump. 
One major cause of new investment spending is the response to opportuni- 
ties created by regional economic integration, both ongoing and anticipated. 
While the peak of  investment spurred by  the expansion and consolidation of 
the European market may already be past, the successful conclusion of negoti- 
ations to establish a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is expected to 
accelerate the growth of  investment flows to Mexico and to the U.S. border 
region. 
Germany’s abrupt turnaround from leading capital exporter to net capital 
importer (see table 6.3) is the consequence of  the unexpectedly high cost of 
reunification. Although some of  this cost reflects the investment required to 
modernize the capital stock of the former East Germany, a substantial part 
stems from the needed clean-up of decades of environmental neglect. The high 
cost of German reunification is thus significant both because of its direct im- 
pact on Germany and the world, but also as an indication of the size of likely 
future financial flows associated with the restructuring of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. 
However, any extrapolation from East Germany to the former Soviet bloc 
must distinguish between the cost of  socially desirable restructuring and the 
cost of  the actual restructuring that can be anticipated in the near future. Al- 
though it accounts for only a small fraction of the region in terms of population 
or area, the former East Germany is in a special position that virtually ensures 
that needed restructuring will actually occur within a relatively brief period. 
The same presumption cannot be made for the other nations (Collins and 
Rodrik 1991). 
The developing nations as a group illustrate the same distinction between 
socially desirable restructuring and likely capital flows: the poorest and least- 
developed nations are unlikely to attract even a proportionate share of  total 
resources flowing to the developing world, and certainly not a share that re- 
flects the  extent  of  needed  economic transformation. However,  important 
changes in  some of  the largest developing nations suggest that the flow of 
private capital to these regions may be larger in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
Despite some recent setbacks (e.g., Peru, Haiti), the move in Latin America 
toward democratically elected governments and market-guided development 
policies has improved the atmosphere for direct foreign investment and for 
private investment in general; in some countries, notably Mexico, changed po- 
litical and economic prospects have halted or even reversed the capital flight 
of the 1980s. In Africa change is also in the wind. A successful political transi- 176  Rachel McCulloch 
tion in South Africa, for example, could mean a resurgence of foreign invest- 
ment in a nation that once attracted large amounts of  capital from abroad. In 
Asia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is once again moving in the direc- 
tion of  market activity, and even India appears to be opening its economy to 
market forces. At least in the near term, the Middle East is likely to invest 
more at home, and thus send less capital elsewhere, as Kuwait rebuilds its 
infrastructure. And across all these regions, greater attention to environmental 
concerns, especially as they apply to the developing world, will translate into 
new  investment projects encouraged by  and  financed  through multilateral 
agencies. 
As with saving, temporary but important factors may reduce investment de- 
mand in some areas. Sharply lower equity prices on the Japanese stock market 
have led some Japanese multinationals to revise their plans for offshore expan- 
sion. Lower prices for real estate, especially commercial real estate, in many 
OECD nations have led developers to scale back plans for new construction. 
In either case, the impact is unlikely to be felt only at the margin, i.e., as small 
reductions across all areas. Rather, each major project still at the planning stage 
will have to be reevaluated. 
6.6  Restoring the Saving-Investment  Balance 
With the potential for substantially increased investment demand in many 
regions, some investment plans will have  to be scrapped or deferred unless 
saving also grows. As  noted above, there is demonstrated potential for new 
Asian supersavers to fill at least part of the incipient gap. But an increase in 
current-account surpluses among the Asian NICs could also create new trade 
frictions. Moreover, unless their contribution becomes very large, some form 
of global capital shortage is nonetheless likely to materialize. Another possibil- 
ity is that governments will choose to save more,5  i.e., to reduce budget deficits 
by spending less or increasing tax revenues.6 
The regional impact of  an incipient capital shortage depends critically on 
the means by which conflicting ex ante plans are reconciled. To the extent that 
interest rates are pushed upward, there are obvious distributional implications 
for borrowing and lending nations. Nations with large external debt could feel 
the kind of pain many developing nations experienced in the early 1980s. This 
group would include many  of the same problem debtors as before, but now 
5. This assumes, as evidence from past OECD behavior suggests, that changes in government 
saving are not  fully offset  by  induced  changes  in private  saving (Dean, Durand,  Fallon,  and 
Hoeller 1990). 
6. For example, Solomon (1991)  concludes his analysis of  a coming capital shortage by noting 
that “the most reliable policy action would be to enlarge government saving. . . . One would hope 
that the end of the Cold War  and the subsequent peace dividend would make this possible without 
undue political strain.” Although recent events make talk of a peace dividend seem premature, the 
Clinton administration has made defense cuts an important element in efforts to reduce the US. 
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also the United States. Higher interest payments on the huge U.S. government 
debt would further complicate America’s problem of  controlling the govern- 
ment deficit, although a large part of the interest payments are to U.S. residents 
and thus do not represent a net burden to the nation. Net lenders could expect 
to benefit correspondingly from high real returns on their assets, assuming that 
borrowers, especially among the developing nations, are not pushed into de- 
fault. Unfortunately, a new round of debt crisis cannot be ruled out. This would 
imperil the promising reforms recently implemented in a number of  devel- 
oping nations. 
However, as suggested above, rising interest rates would be just one possible 
consequence of a global capital shortage, and perhaps not even the most im- 
portant. With capital scarce, most lenders will respond in part by  rationing 
credit rather than simply raising rates. In particular, because of the perceived 
threat to world peace of economic collapse in the former Soviet Union, lending 
there is likely to be determined as much by  international politics as by market 
forces. Likewise, political pressure at home will encourage international com- 
panies  to  limit  new  activities abroad  before  curtailing  planned  domestic 
projects. 
6.7  Direct Investment and Firm Strategy 
So far this discussion has looked only at prospects for aggregate global flows 
of capital, ignoring their composition. But the role of private international capi- 
tal flows in promoting growth in developing nations appears to be tied most 
closely to the investment activities of businesses, i.e., to foreign direct invest- 
ments. Moreover, the volume and even the direction of direct investment flows, 
whether worldwide or between any two regions, is linked only loosely to over- 
all capital flows. Although direct investments do often entail some interna- 
tional transfer of financial capital, this is not their central function. 
Foreign direct investment represents the expansion of a firm’s business activ- 
ities into another country. This can mean establishment of a new local subsid- 
iary, but also acquisition of an existing local enterprise or initiation of a joint 
venture. Direct investors usually possess a competitive advantage such as supe- 
rior technology, managerial know-how, brand recognition, or efficient channels 
for product distribution. Foreign direct investment in effect transfers the firm’s 
competitive advantage for use in a new location. This process is fundamentally 
different from other kinds of  investment because the transfer does not leave 
less of the firm’s intangible capital available for use at the other end. The com- 
petitive advantage can thus be viewed as having the character of a public good 
within the enterprise. (Of course, this does not apply to any financial capital, 
managerial input, or machinery that is also part of the investment package.) 
Firms incur the extra expense of  establishing production facilities abroad 
because the location itself confers a substantial advantage. This advantage may 
reflect the usual elements of comparative advantage as reflected in lower pro- 178  Rachel McCulloch 
duction cost; transport costs, barriers to imports, or host-country policy  in- 
ducements also play an important role in determining the most advantageous 
location for production. However, because expansion through direct invest- 
ment usually means higher cost of management, advantageous location alone 
is not enough to explain the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. Unless the 
investor has an advantage over local firms sufficient to offset the higher costs 
of international coordination, the benefits of location will be captured instead 
by domestic firms. Moreover, unless the parent firm adds over time to its intan- 
gible asset (through new research and development, for example), the relative 
profitability of foreign control is likely to erode over time. In mature industries, 
this erosion produces a tendency for control to shift to local  entrepreneur^.^ 
6.8  Direct Investment in East Asia 
In the  1980s, the scene for an  explosion of  outward direct investment by 
firms in Japan and the Asian NICs was set by three related but distinct changes 
in government policy: elimination of  most restrictions on capital outflows, a 
liberalized regulatory environment toward inward direct investment (in partic- 
ular, a smaller role for performance requirements), and host-country economic 
reforms to bring domestic prices into line with world prices (United Nations 
1992). 
Although in  some cases government policies at home gave firms an extra 
push to  expand operations abroad, a large number of direct investments by 
Asian firms were driven by two location-related factors: exchange rates and 
trade policy. Japanese direct investment accelerated in the second half of  the 
1980s, following the sharp rise in the yen relative to the dollar in  1985. Cur- 
rency revaluations in the late 1980s similarly spurred outward direct invest- 
ments by  firms in Korea and Taiwan (see table 6.5). In all three cases, the 
exchange rate movement, together with rapidly rising wages at home, provided 
firms  with  an  incentive to  move  some manufacturing operations offshore. 
Other Asian nations became favored locations for labor-intensive manufactur- 
ing activities (see table 6.6). 
The direct-investment  responses to changes in trade policy have been more 
complex, reflecting the increased use of  selective trade restrictions by  major 
importing nations. Production is sometimes moved to the importing country, 
as in the case of Japanese automobile production for the North American and 
European markets. Alternatively, it may be shifted to as-yet uncontrolled alter- 
native export sites that  offer  a  significant  cost  advantage. The Multifibre 
Agreement and its various precursors thus provided an important impetus for 
7. Wells (1992) sees such a shift over time to local ownership in the case of NIC investments in 
Indonesia. These are typically low-technology manufacturing operations whose relocation is dic- 
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Table 6.5  Taiwanese and Korean Direct Investment Abroad, 1985-91 
(million $ US.) 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Taiwan 
Korea 
Worldwide total  66  704  4,120  6,951  5,243  1,854 
Worldwide total (A)  121  300  28 1  620  1,332  1,368 
ASEAN (B)  3  177  57  172  441  273 
B/A (%)  2.6  59.1  20.2  27.7  33.1  20.0 
Sources: Central Bank of China, Balance of  Payments:  Taiwan District, the Republic of  China 
(Taipei, December 1992); Bank of  Korea, Foreign Investment (Seoul, various issues [courtesy of 
Won-Am Park]). 
Table 6.6  Direct Investment in Selected East Asian Countries, 1985-91 
(billion $ US.) 
Country  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Malaysia  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.7  1.7  2.5  3.5 
Indonesia  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  1.1  1.5 
Thailand  0.2  0.3  0.2  1.1  1.7  2.3  - 
China (PRC)  1  .o  1.4  1.7  2.3  2.6  2.7  - 
Source: IMF (1992). 
the worldwide dispersion of textile and apparel production, and of the associ- 
ated technology, management skills, and marketing networks, first from Japan 
to the NICs, and more recently from the NICs to less-developed, lower-cost, 
and sometimes less-restricted export sites8 
Although Japan remains the largest single source of  direct investment for 
most Asian nations, other Asian investors now account for a surprisingly large, 
and growing, share. This new pattern may reflect the desire of some host na- 
tions to avoid excessive dependence on a single source of capital or technology, 
as well as the location-related motivation of  the NIC investors already dis- 
cussed. In  1988-89,  the four NICs together committed almost $8 billion to 
direct investments in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, while 
Hong Kong alone registered $6.6 billion of  investments in the PRC over the 
same period (United Nations 1991). For Indonesia, the anticipated inflow of 
new direct investment from other Asian source countries has recently exceeded 
that from Japan (Wells 1992). 
8. See Wells (1992) on NIC foreign direct investments in Indonesia and Petri (1992) on invest- 
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6.9  Implications of Scarce Capital for Direct Investment 
How will a period of global capital shortage or a shorter-term credit crunch 
affect direct investment flows from and into East Asia? The surprising answer 
is that direct investments (and associated transfers of technology and know- 
how) from the Asian NICs into other Asian nations may be headed for a period 
of  even more rapid expansion.  Several related but distinct factors favor the 
expansion of NIC firms into new Asian locations. 
First, for reasons noted above, Japanese firms may scale down their plans 
for foreign expansion, at least temporarily; indeed, several have already an- 
nounced their intentions. Thus, host-country competition to attract NIC invest- 
ments will intensify. While Japanese investments have been especially prized 
by national planning authorities because of their presumed technological excel- 
lence, NIC investments can also offer a welcome technological boost along 
with the other benefits associated with any new project. 
Second, a regime of high capital costs promotes the use of smaller-scale, 
labor-intensive technologies rather than those requiring large investments in 
plant and equipment. This favors the types of projects carried out by smaller 
NIC-based firms over their typically larger and more capital-intensive Japa- 
nese, U.S., and European competitors. New investments will be clustered in 
relatively labor-intensive industries, and within any given industry, in the more 
labor-intensive production technologies. 
Third, the likely expansion of labor-intensive production activities will in 
turn enhance the location advantage of relatively low-wage Asian nations like 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and perhaps the PRC and Vietnam over location 
sites elsewhere, especially Europe and North America. Although Eastern Eu- 
rope also offers low labor costs as well as greater proximity to Western mar- 
kets, problems of  property rights, dispute resolution, and worker motivation 
(all familiar to firms with investments in the PRC) are substantial deterrents. 
In addition, Asian sites are favored by many smaller investors on account of 
physical proximity, family ties, or cultural propinquity. 
Finally, even if interest rates move upward, there may be reason to expect 
relatively little impact on capital costs for smaller firms based in the NICs. 
Much of the investment by these firms is financed either internally or by local 
partners in the host country, so conditions in global capital markets may play 
only a remote role in determining the cost of these funds. In Korea, the move 
toward liberalization of internal capital markets may even have the effect of 
reducing borrowing costs for smaller firms as government policy attempts to 
limit chaebol economic dominance. 
6.10  Concluding Comments 
The review of developments in worldwide patterns of saving and investment 
suggests that both a short-term credit crunch and a longer-term capital short- 181  An Asian Capital Crunch? Implications of a Global Capital Shortage 
age, while by no means assured, may be realistic concerns. However, the exam- 
ination also underscores that few if any of the important capital-market devel- 
opments of  the past two decades could have been foreseen from a similar 
exercise of adding up anticipated changes in the supply of savings and demand 
for investment. 
Even in a world of highly integrated capital markets, the consequences of 
either a crunch or a prolonged shortage are unlikely to materialize mainly as a 
marginal adjustment to higher interest rates. Rather, any large change in mar- 
ket conditions will promote major shifts across markets, or between market 
and nonmarket credit sources. Even in market transactions, an important part 
of  the  adjustment will  come through  nonprice  mechanisms for  allocating 
credit. 
Of  course any rise in interest rates will favor lenders. However, in the spe- 
cific area of foreign direct investment the impact is complex. Direct investors 
are typically both sources and users of capital. Moreover, high capital costs 
favor some investments and some investment sites over others. The particular 
characteristics of  direct investment carried out by firms located in the Asian 
NICs in other Asian nations suggest that a regime of higher capital costs will 
favor rapid growth of direct investment, and associated transfers of technology 
and know-how, from the Asian NICs into other Asian nations. An unexpected 
consequence of a global capital shortage may thus be to reduce the dependence 
of Asian developing nations on Japan as a source of  technology and capital. 
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COIIlmeIlt  Chong-Hyun Nam 
Rachel McCulloch sets out two important propositions in her interesting paper. 
One is that a short-term credit crunch along with a long-term capital shortage 
is now becoming a real possibility. The other is that, surprisingly enough, such 
a global capital shortage is likely to cause Asian NICs to expand, rather than 
contract,  their direct investments into other Asian developing  nations.  Both 
propositions are based on careful reviews of surrounding factors. I would like 
to address my comments to each of these two propositions. 
Indeed,  I agree with McCulloch's  first proposition.  As she detailed in her 
paper, there is ample evidence to believe that global savings will fail to meet 
global demand for investment in coming years. In most OECD nations, as well 
as in many  OPEC nations, excess savings over domestic investment are not 
likely to be generated for some time. At the same time, demand for outside 
sources of funds is expected to rise significantly in many Eastern European 
countries as well as in the former soviet republics. 
The Asian NICs will not be of much help either. Unless the United States 
changes its trade policy toward  the NICs, they are not likely to remain su- 
persavers too much longer. Korea is a good case in point. Of the Asian su- 
persavers, Korea has already become a net capital importer since 1990, after a 
short period of trade surplus from 1986 to 1989. Of course, many factors con- 
tributed to this, but  persistent  U.S. pressure  on the Korean government for 
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currency revaluation was certainly a major one. As then-US.  Trade Represen- 
tative Carla Hills testified before the U.S. Congress, U.S. trade policy toward 
Korea was most successful on that score. If the United States achieves the same 
victory over the rest of the Asian NICs, these countries will soon cease to be 
supersavers, as well. 
In addition to such gloomy prospects for regional savings and investment 
demand, there are now  some indications that the world economy is coming 
out of  recession, which is bound to increase investment demand relative to 
savings capacity. 
Now,  let me turn to McCulloch’s second proposition, that an unexpected 
consequence of such a global capital shortage may be increased foreign direct 
investments by Asian NICs in other Asian developing countries, making these 
nations less dependent on Japan. I have reservations about this proposition on 
several grounds. 
First of all, given the current level of trade surplus in Japan and the prospect 
that it will be maintained for some time, I wonder where Japan will turn to 
dump its extra savings. My hunch is that it will keep increasing its portfolio as 
well as its direct investments abroad. Certainly Asian developing nations will 
remain attractive sites for Japanese investors. So, in my view, the recent slow- 
down of Japanese foreign direct investment in Asian developing nations may 
be only a transitional phenomenon. 
Second, of  the Asian NIC supersavers, Korea, as I mentioned earlier, has 
already become a net capital importer, and other Asian NICs may follow suit 
as long as the United States sticks to its current trade policy. In my view, this 
policy is likely to continue into the Clinton administration. In other words, 
given their large dependence on the U.S.  market, Asian NICs may choose to 
ease trade frictions vis-A-vis the United States by  increasing domestic invest- 
ment demand rather than generating excess savings over domestic investments. 
If this is the case, then, any foreign direct investments they make would need 
to be financed by foreign savings, which are expected to become increasingly 
tight. 
Finally, I have a hunch that the Asian NICs, as well as Japan, are likely to 
keep their outward direct investment at a rather high level mainly because their 
economic growth rate is likely to remain higher than that of  the rest of  the 
world, and so they  will need to make quicker structural adjustments. Many 
firms and industries with diminishing comparative advantage may, therefore, 
wish to relocate their production sites into other Asian developing nations. 
An  important question is whether their outward direct investment will be 
encouraged or discouraged as external capital market conditions become more 
tight. I think this will depend, to a large extent, on the degree of substitutability 
or complementarity between direct investment and other types of capital move- 
ments, especially when the global capital market becomes more tight. I think 
this is an empirical question yet to be answered. 184  Rachel McCulloch 
Comment  Kazumi Asako 
Rachel McCulloch has presented a very neat and concise paper on worldwide 
capital markets centering especially on an Asian capital crunch. Many issues 
are discussed in the paper, and I agree with most of the conclusions. But, in 
order to play the discussant’s role, I will pick up several issues and raise ques- 
tions. 
First, as a general comment, I would like to express a bit of dissatisfaction, 
as follows: In many places McCulloch states important propositions and obser- 
vations without referring to the actual data. In other words, her analysis is 
mostly qualitative in nature and lacks quantitative or statistical foundations. I 
think McCulloch should include statistical analysis or simulation analysis to 
improve the persuasiveness of the paper. 
Second, I question whether one of the most important conclusions of  the 
paper has quantitative support. That is, I wonder whether the role played by 
East Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan as capital exporters to the other 
Asian countries is large enough to replace the role played by Japan. McCulloch 
observes that Japan’s role as a capital exporter to the Asian countries will de- 
crease in the 1990s partly because stock and land prices have fallen in Japan. 
But, I think both Korea and Taiwan have  also experienced declines in stock 
and real estate prices. For this reason, I cannot imagine how these countries 
can afford capital exports large enough to replace Japan’s. 
Third, I agree that a regime of high capital costs promotes the use of smaller- 
scale, labor-intensive technologies rather than those requiring large invest- 
ments in plant and equipment. But, again, I would like to know the quantitative 
importance of this substitution effect. Without any solid data analysis, the con- 
clusion that the higher the capital costs the larger the direct investments from 
the Asian NIEs into other Asian nations is not secured. 
Fourth and finally, I would like to know how McCulloch assesses the capital 
flows which are related to environmental protection, which is a hot issue nowa- 
days. Capital flows of Japanese official development aid (ODA) are likely to 
change because of environmental considerations. How about capital flows be- 
tween East Asian countries and other Asian countries? 
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